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<h4>Resolution Details</h4>
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<strong>Company:</strong>
<p>AFLAC Inc.</p>
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<strong>Year:</strong>
<p>2025 </p>
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<strong>Issue Area:</strong>
<p>Corporate Governance </p>
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<strong>Focus Area:</strong>
<p>Executive Compensation </p>
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<strong>Status:</strong>
<p>Omitted</p>
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<h2>Resolution Text</h2>
<p>Shareholders ask the Board of Directors to amend the Company Policy on recoupment of incentive pay to apply to the each Named Executive Officer and to state that conduct or negligence – not merely misconduct – shall trigger mandatory application of that policy. Also the Board shall report to shareholders in each annual meeting proxy the results of any deliberations regarding the policy, including the Board’s reasons for not applying the policy after specific deliberations conclude, about whether or not to cancel or seek recoupment of unearned compensation paid, granted or awarded to NEOs under this policy. </p>
<p>This improved clawback policy shall at least be included in the Governess Guidelines of the Company or similar document and be easily accessible on the Company website.</p>
<p>The current Clawback Policy is clearly incomplete and can be difficult for shareholders to locate. </p>
<p>Wells Fargo offers a prime example of why Aflac needs a stronger policy. After 2016 Congressional hearings, Wells Fargo agreed to pay $185 million to resolve claims of fraudulent sales practices. The Wells Fargo Board then moved to claw back $136 million from 2 top executives. Wells Fargo unfortunately concluded that the CEO had only turned a blind eye to the practice of opening fraudulent accounts and thus failed to attempt any clawback and left $136 million on the table.</p>
<p>At minimum this proposal alerts Aflac shareholders that Aflac executives can now be richly rewarded when they are negligent. This is the wrong incentive for Aflac executives at a time when the best incentives for Aflac executives should be supported.</p>
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<h3>Lead Filer</h3>
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<div class=”views-field views-field-nothing”><span class=”field-content”> John Chevedden</span></div><div class=”views-field views-field-title views-field-field-shareholder”><span class=”field-content”>Chevedden Corporate Governance</span></div>
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