

Notice of Exempt Solicitation Pursuant to Rule 14a-103

Name of Registrant: Wells Fargo & Company (WFC)

Title: Simple Majority Vote + Reject Director Davis

Meeting Date: April 28, 2026

Name of person relying on exemption: John Chevedden, WFC
Shareholder since 2016

Address of persons relying on exemption: POB 2673, Redondo
Beach, CA 90278

These written materials are submitted pursuant to Rule 14a-6(g)(1) promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. John Chevedden does not beneficially own more than \$5 million of the class of subject securities, and this notice of exempt solicitation is therefore being provided on a voluntary basis.

This is not a solicitation of authority to vote your proxy. Please DO NOT send me your proxy card; the shareholder is not able to vote your proxies, nor does this communication contemplate such an event.

The shareholder asks all shareholders to vote by following the procedural instructions provided in the proxy materials.



The Simple Majority Vote Proposal 6 Deserves your Vote of Support

The Simple Majority Vote Proposal 6 hardly needs a supporting

statement. Well Fargo (WFC) shareholders already voted 97% in support of this proposal topic in 2024 when Well Fargo sponsored this proposal topic. However under the long ago obsolete Wells Fargo rules this 97% vote, based on for and against votes, *only* translated into an almost 79% vote based on all WFC shares outstanding when an 80% vote was required.

One would expect that a well-governed company would try again to move the needle from 79% to 80% but this is not what WFC did. In addition to not resubmitting this proposal topic WFC now opposes a shareholder proposal on the same topic that won 97% support in 2024. WFC appears to have devoted significant staff hours to a campaign to convince WFC shareholders the proposal topic that won their 97% support should be relegated to the dustbin.

This WFC drive to ignore a 97% WFC shareholder vote is a good reason to reject Richard Davis, Chair of the WFC Governance Committee. Mr. Davis is ultimately responsible for the WFC efforts to convince WFC shareholders to forever forget the proposal topic that they gave 97% support to. The 97% approval was higher than the approval for 2024 WFC executive pay and there is no WFC effort to forget that vote. WFC would have moved heaven and earth if its 2024 executive pay vote was coming in 1% short of approval.

Under Mr. Davis' leadership WFC was not satisfied with an opposition statement after this proposal. WFC added a 600-word bad-mouth introductory statement at the beginning of the shareholder proposals in the 2026 proxy. WFC also violated rule 14a-8 by not giving the shareholder proposal sponsors an

advance copy of its double barrel opposition statement.

The WFC conduct in response to this 97% vote is a stain on any claim that WFC purportedly values genuine shareholder engagement or outreach.