

Notice of Exempt Solicitation Pursuant to Rule 14a-103  
Name of Registrant: TransUnion (TRU)  
Title: Special Shareholder Meeting  
Meeting Date: May 12, 2026  
Name of person relying on exemption: John Chevedden, TRU  
Shareholder since 2022  
Address of persons relying on exemption: POB 2673,  
Redondo Beach, CA 90278

These written materials are submitted pursuant to Rule 14a-6(g)(1) promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. John Chevedden does not beneficially own more than \$5 million of the class of subject securities, and this notice of exempt solicitation is therefore being provided on a voluntary basis.

This is not a solicitation of authority to vote your proxy. Please DO NOT send me your proxy card; the shareholder is not able to vote your proxies, nor does this communication contemplate such an event.

The shareholder asks all shareholders to vote by following the procedural instructions provided in the proxy materials.



## **The Special Shareholder Meeting Proposal 4 Deserves your Vote of Support**

The TransUnion (TRU) statement next to this shareholder proposal could be called ridiculous. It says in effect that since TRU does not agree with the 10% figure in Proposal 4, TRU it is opposed to its shareholders having any right whatsoever to call for a special shareholder meeting.

TRU is a Delaware company and shareholders in a Delaware company can have the right to call for a special shareholder meeting and the right to act by written consent. TRU shareholders have neither right which is all the more incentive for TRU shareholders to at have one of these rights which is what this proposal is about.

And the TRU concern about 10% of shares is unfounded. More than 100 major companies have initially opposed a shareholder right to call for a special shareholder meeting, but not one of these companies have ever claimed that a special shareholder meeting ever took place at a company that requires 15% or more shares to call for a special shareholder meeting.

Of course companies want a 15% or higher figure because they know that a 15% or higher figure means a special meeting will never take place.

TRU then makes the weak claim that TRU shareholders should be distracted from even considering the merits of this proposal because TRU shareholders should alternatively just be happy

that TRU has a number of governance practices that most other companies have.