
Notice of Exempt Solicitation Pursuant to Rule 14a-103

Name of Registrant: The Sherwin-Williams Company (SHW)

Title: Shareholders Can Vote for 2 Special Shareholder Meeting Proposals

Meeting Date: April 22, 2026

Name of person relying on exemption: John Chevedden, SHW Shareholder since 2020

Address of persons relying on exemption: POB 2673, Redondo Beach, CA 90278

These written materials are submitted pursuant to Rule 14a-6(g)(1) promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. John Chevedden does not beneficially own more than \$5 million of the class of subject securities, and this notice of exempt solicitation is therefore being provided on a voluntary basis.

This is not a solicitation of authority to vote your proxy.

Please DO NOT send me your proxy card; the shareholder is not able to vote your proxies, nor does this communication contemplate such an event.

The shareholder asks all shareholders to vote by following the procedural instructions provided in the proxy materials.



Sherwin-Williams Company (SHW) Shareholders Can Vote for Both Special Shareholder Meeting Proposals, Proposal 4 and Proposal 5

Proposal 5 will give 10% of Sherwin-Williams Company (SHW) shareholders the right to call for a special shareholder meeting and all SHW shares can formally participate.

Proposal 4 is an odd duck of a company proposal because it is only an advisory proposal. When a company puts forth a shareholder rights proposal on the annual meeting ballot it is usually a binding proposal. The main purpose of the odd duck Proposal 4 is to steal votes from Proposal 5 which is on the same topic.

SHW seems to be engaging in an unethical practice. A shareholder proposal cannot duplicate a company and SHW is taking advantage of a loophole where a company proposal can duplicate a shareholder proposal. Mr. Matthew Thornton, Chair of the SHW Governance Committee, is ultimately responsible for this marginal practice by SHW.

Proposal 5 was drafted first and Proposal 4 was a latecomer to steal votes.

Proposal 4 is masquerading as giving shareholders a right to call for a special shareholder meeting. With Proposal 4 there are 2 poison pill like barriers that are too challenging and make up the masquerade.

The first barrier is a need for a formal backing of 25% of shares to call for a special shareholder meeting. A 25% requirement seems too high because more than 100 companies have initially opposed a shareholder right to call for a special shareholder meeting and not one of these companies have ever cited one example of a special shareholder meeting ever taking place since 1945 where the requirement was 25%.

The second barrier is that Proposal 4 gives SHW the option to attach a big ball and chain to its 25% requirement by disqualifying a substantial block of SHW shares from making up the 25% figure. More than 100 companies have initially opposed a shareholder right to call for a special shareholder meeting and not one of these companies have ever cited one example of a special shareholder meeting ever taking place since 1945 where a substantial block of shares were disqualified.