

Notice of Exempt Solicitation Pursuant to Rule 14a-103
Name of Registrant: The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. (GS)
Title: Special Shareholder Meeting Proposal
Meeting Date: April 29, 2026
Name of person relying on exemption: John Chevedden, GS
Shareholder since 2017
Address of persons relying on exemption: POB 2673, Redondo
Beach, CA 90278

These written materials are submitted pursuant to Rule 14a-6(g)(1) promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. John Chevedden does not beneficially own more than \$5 million of the class of subject securities, and this notice of exempt solicitation is therefore being provided on a voluntary basis.

This is not a solicitation of authority to vote your proxy. Please DO NOT send me your proxy card; the shareholder is not able to vote your proxies, nor does this communication contemplate such an event.

The shareholder asks all shareholders to vote by following the procedural instructions provided in the proxy materials.

The Special Shareholder Meeting Proposal 4 Deserves Shareholder Support

Goldman Sachs (GS) has a number of worn-out empty suit arguments next to this proposal.

GS claims that its current requirement of 25% of shares to call for a special shareholder meeting is “meaningful.” However

more than 100 major companies have initially opposed a shareholder right to call for a special shareholder meeting, but not one of these companies have ever claimed that a special shareholder meeting ever took place at a company of significant size that requires 15% or more shares to call for a special shareholder meeting.

Of course companies want a 15% or higher figure (with GS it is 25%) because they know that a 15% or higher figure means a special shareholder meeting will never take place.

GS claims that GS with its market cap of \$240 Billion needs to be penny wise on the cost of a shareholder meeting. I do not believe that of the 100s of companies that have initially opposed this proposal that there has ever been cited a dollar figure for a shareholder meeting. If a shareholder meeting increased GS revenue by \$1 Billion, from \$240 Billion to \$241 Billion, by better focusing its strategy would it be worth the cost of a meeting. GS apparently favors saving the cost of a meeting.

GS concludes with the empty suit of shareholder engagement on an informal basis as an alternative to a special shareholder meeting. Of the 100s of companies that initially opposed this proposal topic there has never been cited one example of how such informal shareholder engagement ever saved a company money, increased its revenues or changed its strategic direction.