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## **Notice of Exempt Solicitation Pursuant to Rule 14a-103**

Name of Registrant: Cigna Corp. (CI)

Title: Shareholder Right to Act by Written Consent

Meeting Date: April 22, 2026

Name of person relying on exemption: John Chevedden, CI Shareholder since 2015

Address of persons relying on exemption: POB 2673, Redondo Beach, CA 90278

These written materials are submitted pursuant to Rule 14a-6(g)(1) promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. John Chevedden does not beneficially own more than \$5 million of the class of subject securities, and this notice of exempt solicitation is therefore being provided on a voluntary basis.

This is not a solicitation of authority to vote your proxy.

Please DO NOT send me your proxy card; the shareholder is not able to vote your proxies, nor does this communication contemplate such an event.

The shareholder asks all shareholders to vote by following the procedural instructions provided in the proxy materials.



### **Proposal 4 for a Cigna Corp. (CI) shareholder right to act by written consent deserves shareholder support**

The Cigna statement next to the proposal is disappointing. It is based on deception and distraction. The deception element raises the question of whether Cigna could ever conduct a so-called “robust shareholder out reach campaign” as claimed in its statement.

The beginning of the Cigna statement deceptively claims that Cigna shareholders have a right for 25% of Cigna shares to call for a special shareholder meeting.

However there is a big fat material omission. Cigna fails to mention that a significant block of

Cigna shares are completely disqualified from calling for a special shareholder meeting. Thus it could take 40% of the Cigna shares (left standing after Cigna's disqualification) to call for a special shareholder meeting.

Shame on Cigna for citing the 25% figure 5-times without ever mentioning the ball and chain attached to it – that a substantial block of Cigna shares are completely disqualified from being part of the 25% figure.

Cigna's argument is further flawed. Proposal 4 does not ask shareholders to choose between a shareholder right to act by written consent and a shareholder right to call a special shareholder meeting although Cigna seems to present it as such.

Shareholders are best served when they have both rights. And Cigna's current shareholder right to call for a special shareholder meeting is so weak for a company that is worth \$70 Billion that this creates an added incentive for Cigna shareholders to have a right to act by written consent.

Shame on Cigna for suggesting that shareholders limit themselves to one shareholder right when Cigna shareholders are entitled to 2 shareholder rights under state law.

And Cigna does not understand the right to act by written consent.

Written consent is a shareholder right that requires the formal backing of a Cigna majority based on all shares outstanding. This majority support requirement in reality is much more than majority support because it is not economically possible to contact a significant percent of Cigna shares to get their formal backing.

Thus for an issue to still get majority support, based on all shares outstanding, under written consent it could need 70% support from the Cigna shares are economically possible to reach. And the Cigna shares that are economically possible to reach are the Cigna shares that are most informed and have the greatest incentive to cast an informed ballot.

Cigna then claims that Cigna shareholders should be distracted from even considering the merits of this proposal because Cigna shareholders should alternatively just be happy that Cigna has a number of governance practices that most other companies have.