



FOR

Shareholder Rights

Cincinnati Financial Corporation (CINF) Shareholders Can Vote for Both Special Shareholder Meeting Proposals, Proposal 2 and Proposal 3

These proposals are in reverse order because the shareholder Proposal 3 was drafted first and the CINF Proposal 2 came later.

Proposal 2 is masquerading as giving shareholders a right to call for a special shareholder meeting. With Proposal 2 there is a poison pill like barrier that is too challenging.

Proposal 3 by contrast is for an attainable shareholder right to call for a special shareholder meeting.

Only Proposal 2 has a barrier that makes it a sort of a placebo right for shareholders to call for a special shareholder meeting because history shows that Proposal 2 is unusable.

The barrier in Proposal 2 is a need for a formal backing of 25% of all shares outstanding to call for a special shareholder meeting. A 25% requirement is too high because more than 100 companies have initially opposed a shareholder right to call for a special shareholder meeting and not one of these companies

have ever cited one example of a special shareholder meeting ever taking place since 1945 where the requirement was 25%.

CINF also seems to be engaging in a questionable practice. A shareholder proposal cannot duplicate a company proposal. CINF is taking advantage of a loophole where a company proposal can, by contrast, duplicate a shareholder proposal if a company simply decides to do so.

CINF shareholders can vote for both Special Shareholder Meeting Proposals, Proposal 2 and Proposal 3. Proposal 3 is the more important proposal for non-insider CINF shareholders.

Notice of Exempt Solicitation Pursuant to Rule 14a-103

Name of Registrant: Cincinnati Financial Corporation (CINF)

Title: Shareholders Can Vote for 2 Special Shareholder Meeting Proposals

Meeting Date: May 2, 2026

Name of person relying on exemption: John Chevedden, CINF Shareholder since 2021

Address of persons relying on exemption: POB 2673, Redondo Beach, CA 90278

These written materials are submitted pursuant to Rule 14a-6(g)(1) promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

John Chevedden does not beneficially own more than \$5 million of the class of subject securities, and this notice of exempt solicitation is therefore being provided on a voluntary basis.

This is not a solicitation of authority to vote your proxy. Please DO NOT send me your proxy card; the shareholder is not able to vote your proxies, nor does this communication contemplate such an event.

The shareholder asks all shareholders to vote by following the procedural instructions provided in the proxy materials.