



Proposal 5 for a Boeing shareholder right to act by written consent deserves shareholder support

This proposal topic won 44% support at a previous Boeing shareholder meeting. This 44% support was all the more impressive because shareholder proposals automatically get a lot of against votes from the shareholders who do not have access to independent proxy voting advice.

Boeing has a flawed argument next to Proposal 5. Proposal 5 does not ask shareholders to choose between a shareholder right to act by written consent and a shareholder right to call a special shareholder meeting although Boeing tries to present it as such.

Shareholders are best served when they have both rights. And Boeing's current shareholder right to call for a special shareholder meeting is so weak that this creates an added incentive for Boeing shareholders to have a right to act by written consent.

Shame on Boeing for suggesting that shareholders limit themselves to one shareholder right when Boeing shareholders are entitled to 2 shareholder rights under state law.

And Boeing does not understand the right to act by written consent.

Written consent is a shareholder right that requires the formal backing of a majority based on all shares outstanding. This majority support requirement in reality is much more than majority support because it is not economically possible to contact a significant percent of Boeing shares to get their formal backing.

Thus for an issue to still get majority support, based on all shares outstanding,

under written consent it could need 70% support from the Boeing shares are economically possible to reach.

Boeing unrealistically claims that when 70% of the Boeing shares, that are economically reachable, are so convinced of value of a certain action, that it is important to get the input of the remaining minority of Boeing shareholders who are the most difficult and costly to reach and are the least inclined to vote.

Boeing is one of many companies that incorrectly claim that that written consent gives too much influence to a minority. The only role for a minority with written consent is to initiate an action that has a chance of obtaining the above 70% Boeing shareholder support. Unless there is 70% Boeing shareholder support an issue fails.

Notice of Exempt Solicitation Pursuant to Rule 14a-103

Name of Registrant: The Boeing Company (BA)

Meeting Date: April 17, 2026

Name of person relying on exemption: John Chevedden, Boeing Shareholder since 2010

Address of persons relying on exemption: POB 2673, Redondo Beach, CA 90278

These written materials are submitted pursuant to Rule 14a-6(g)(1) promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. John Chevedden does not beneficially own more than \$5 million of the class of subject securities, and this notice of exempt solicitation is therefore being provided on a voluntary basis.

This is not a solicitation of authority to vote your proxy.

Please DO NOT send me your proxy card; the shareholder is not able to vote your proxies, nor does this communication contemplate such an event.

The shareholder asks all shareholders to vote by following the procedural instructions provided in the proxy materials.