Executive Compensation

2005 – AT&T

 

 

RESOLVED:  Shareholders request that the Board adopt a policy to seek shareholder approval of any future supplemental executive retirement plan (“SERP”) or individual retirement arrangement for senior executives that provides preferential benefit formulas or supplemental pension benefits not provided to other managers under the Company’s regular tax-qualified plan.  Implementation of this policy shall not breach any existing employment agreement or vested benefit.

 

SUPPORTING STATEMENT

Companies establish SERPs to provide supplemental retirement benefits that exceed IRS limitations on benefits that can be paid from tax-qualified pension plans.  In addition to its traditional SERP, which provides contributions on salary above the IRS limits, AT&T maintains a second SERP providing officers with additional contributions not available to other managers.  AT&T also maintains “individual pensions” for certain officers that guarantee them lifetime pension annuities on far more generous terms than apply to other managers.

 

These plans together provide a substantial extra component of compensation.  AT&T estimated that CEO Dorman and CFO Horton will receive annual payments of $1.99 million and $1.42 million, respectively, at age 65.

 

Unlike most companies with SERPs, AT&T also provides “individual non-qualified pension arrangements” to certain executive officers that have the effect of granting extra years of service credit.  For example, after just four years of service, CEO Dorman is vested in a supplemental pension equal (in 2005) to 34.7% of his final three-year average total compensation – and he accrues 3.6% for each additional year of service (to a maximum 60%).   

 

Dorman’s employment agreement also includes a “pension parachute.”  If he terminates prior to 2010 due to a change in control, his minimum annual pension is boosted by an additional 10.8% of final compensation.

 

In comparison, prior to 1998, employees accrued 1.6% of final average pay per year of service under AT&T’s Management Pension Plan – and would have needed over 20 years service to replace 34.7% of salary in retirement.  Moreover, in 1998 AT&T converted to a cash balance formula, freezing pension contributions for thousands of managers for up to 13 years, and reducing expected total benefits as much as 50% for some employees. A class action lawsuit regarding the conversion is currently pending in federal court.

 

As AT&T downsizes, we believe these gross disparities between the retirement security offered to senior executives and to other employees create potential morale problems and reputational risk, and may increase employee turnover.

 

Moreover, because these forms of pension compensation are not performance-based, they do not help to align management incentives with long-term shareholder interests.  Shareholder approval of these benefits would help to ensure reasonable formulas for future agreements.

 

Because prior shareholder approval is often not practical, the Company would have the option to seek approval after the material terms of an executive’s employment agreement are determined.

 

 



Sponsors:

Lead: Domini Social Investments, Kimberly Gladman Shareholder Advocacy Associate