CEO Compensation

2005 – Cendant Corp.

 

 

RESOLVED: The shareholders urge the Board of Directors:

·         To limit the Compensation paid to the CEO in any fiscal year to no more than 100 times the average Compensation paid to the company’s Non-Managerial Workers in the prior fiscal year, unless the shareholders have approved paying the CEO a greater amount;

·         In any proposal for shareholder approval, to provide that the CEO can receive more than the 100-times amount only if the company achieves one or more goals that would mainly reflect the CEO’s contributions rather than general market conditions; and

·         In that proposal, to assure the shareholders that the Board will seriously consider reducing the CEO’s compensation in the event of any unusual reduction in the company’s workforce resulting from outsourcing or other factors.

 

This proposal does not apply to the extent that complying would necessarily breach a compensation agreement in effect at the time of the present shareholder meeting.

 

“Compensation” means salary, bonus, the grant-date present value of stock options, the grant-date present value of restricted stock, payments under long-term incentive plans, and “other annual” and “all other compensation” as those categories are defined for proxy statement purposes.

 

“Non-Managerial Workers” means U.S.-based employees working in the categories of Blue-Collar Occupations or Service Occupations or the Sales and Administrative Support components of White-Collar Occupations as used by the Bureau of Labor Statistics in its National Compensation Surveys.

 

Supporting Statement: 

Our resolution is based on these premises:

  1. Unless internally anchored, market-based compensation methods tend to produce excessive CEO compensation;
  2. Very high CEO pay should require shareholder approval since it tends to produce sub par share performance long-term; and
  3. Very highly paid CEOs should realize that they might share some pain when choosing job reductions as a means to achieve corporate goals. 

 

Our resolution would introduce an internal foundation for CEO compensation—the company’s CEO/average-worker pay ratio.  Commentators note that on the average for U.S. companies this ratio has gone from about 42 in 1980 to several hundred today and that it tends to be much lower in foreign companies that compete successfully with U.S. companies.   Consistent with these facts, the Blue Ribbon Commission of the National Association of Corporate Directors has urged compensation committees to use such a ratio as a factor in setting CEO compensation.  Our resolution follows this advice.

 

Our resolution would not arbitrarily limit CEO compensation.  Rather, it would offer the board the opportunity to persuade the shareholders that very high CEO compensation would make the company more competitive and would be in their interest.

 

At Black & Decker, CEO Compensation was 6.1, 11.2, and 19.3 million dollars in 2001, 2002, and 2003.  The 2003 Compensation is 755 times the $25,501 that the average U.S. worker makes according to the AFL-CIO’s Executive Paywatch (http://www.aflcio.org/corporateamerica/paywatch/).  In their 2004 analyses of executive pay versus shareholder return, Business Week gave the CEO its worst rating (http://www.businessweek.com/pdfs/2004/0416_execpay.pdf), and Forbes gave the CEO a grade of D (http://www.forbes.com/lists/2004/04/21/04ceoland.html).

 



Sponsors:

Lead: Catholic Equity Fund, Theodore Zimmer President; Christus Health; Sisters of St. Joseph, Philadelphia